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HONDA MEETS ANASTASOFF: THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
AGAINST RULES PROHIBITING CITATION
TO UNPUBLISHED JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Abstract: Last year's Eighth Circuit decision of Anastasoff v. United States
drew new attention to the much-debated rules limiting citation to
unpublished judicial decisions. The scholarly opinion of Chief Judge
Richard Arnold sent a shockwave through the bench, bar, and legal
academy by ruling that no-citation rules were an unconstitutional
expansion of the federal judiciary's Article III powers. Post Anastasoff
scholarly commentary has focused on Article III arguments and
remolded policy arguments that were made prior to the decision. Little
attention has been paid, however, to the way in which no-citation rules
impair constitutional rights of individual litigants. This Note traces the
historical practice of using prior judicial decisions in arguments to
courts, dating back to thirteenth century England. The author then
argues that current rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished
decisions remove a deeply-rocited common law procedure, and,
therefore, deprive litigants of their procedural due process rights.
INTRODUCTION
The recent Eighth Circuit decision in Anastasoff v. United States
(hereinafter "Ansastasoff I") drew new attention to the much-debated
rules limiting opinion publication and citation to unpublished deci-
sions.' The scholarly decision of highly regarded Chief Judge Richard
Arnold2 sent a shockwave through the bench, bar and legal academy. 3
1 See 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en bane, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
2 See Tony Mauro, Stealth Decisions Under Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 1. ("Part of
the instant weight given to the [Anastasoff !J decision stems from the credibility of its
author. Once on President Bill Clinton's short list for a Supreme Court appointment,
Arnold won the prestigious Devitt Award for Distinguished Service to Justice last year and
is well-known throughout the federal bench.").
s Numerous news articles and editorials discussing Anastasoff I quickly appeared. See,
e.g., Reynolds Holding, Judges' Unpublished ,Opinions Uncovered, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2000
(page unavailable); Kevin Livingston, 8th' Circuit: Barring Citation of Unpublished Opinion
Unconstitutional, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 25, 2000, at 4; Carolyn Magnuson, Eighth
Circuit Declares Citation Ban Unconstitutional, TRIAL, Jan. 2001, at 88; Tony Mauro, fudge Ig-
nites Storm over Unpublished Opinions, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Sept. 5, 2000 (page
unavailable); Mauro, supra note 2, at 1; Roger ParIoff, It's Time to End the Patently Unfair
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Although limited publication and citation rules had already been the
subject of frequent commentary and discussion in the legal commu-
nity, Judge Arnold added a new twist: the practice was unconstitu-
tional. 4
Prior to Anastasoff I, most of the debate surrounding limited pub-
lication and no-citation rules was based on theories of judicial policy,
precedential development and governmental transparency.5
 Little at-
tention had been given to the constitutional implications of this wide-
spread practice. 6
 Judge Arnold, however, now had the attention of the
legal community. 7
 Legal publications were quickly filled with stories
on Anastasoff I and its potential local impacts Leading academics and
court-watchers predicted' Supreme Court review. 9
 Judges and litigants
across the country began citing to unpublished decisions in spite of
Practice of Selective Publication, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Oct. 5, 2000, at 15; Evan Shultz, Gone
Hunting: judge Richard Arnold of the 8th Circuit Has Taken Aim at Unpublished Opinions, But
Missed His Mart LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 78.
4 See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 905. It is worth noting that Judge Arnold foreshadowed
the arguments contained in Anastasoff I iu an article submitted to the Journal of Appellate
Practice. See Richard Arnold, Unpublished Opinion: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219
(1999).
5
 See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, trill the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if they Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat,
44 Am. U. L. REV. 757 (1995); Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!
Why VW Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Decisions, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, June 2000, at 43;
Boyce Martin, In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. U. 177 (1999); William Rey-
nolds & William Richnian, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) (hereinafter
"Reynolds & Richmond"); William Reynolds & William Richman, An Evaluation of Limited
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 573
(1981); Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Repub-
lication, and thalin 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109 (1995); see also Robert J. Martineau,
Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: a Reassessment, 28 U. Mictr. J.L.
REFORM 119, 126 n. 39 (1994) (discussing policy arguments for and against practice of
limited publication and no-citation rules and citing more than twenty pieces of scholarly
commentary on subject).
6 See David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeal, 63 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 128, 141-45 (1977). To my knowledge, this is the only piece of scholarship
specifically questioning the constitutionality of rules prohibiting citation and limiting
opinion publication.
7 See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., F.ron Berg, Unpublished Decisions; Routine Cases or Shadow Precedents?, WASH.
STATE BAR NEWS (Dec. 2000); John P. Borger & Chad Oldfather, The Uncertain Status of
Unpublished Opinions, 57 BF-NCH & B. MINN. 36 (Dec. 2000); J. Wylie Donald & Pamela Keyl,
Practicalities and Unpublished Decisions, N.J. U. Dec. 4, 2000 (page unavailable).
9 See Mauro, supra note 2, at 1.
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prohibitive local rules." Scholarly articles in legal journals and law
reviews quickly appeared." A drumbeat for the abolition of these
rules was building.
Then the march toward abolition was slowed. While rehearing
the Anastasoff I decision en banc, the Eighth Circuit was persuaded by
the government's argument that the underlying tax case had become
moot. 12 According to Eighth Circuit procedure, the original panel
decision—Anastasoff I—was thus vacated. 13 Judge Arnold, however,
writing for the en banc court, maintained, "[t]he constitutionality of
that portion of Rule 28A(i) which says that unpublished opinions
have no precedential effect remains an open question in this Cir-
cuit."" Indeed, the constitutionality of similar rules remains an open
question throughout the federal judiciary:15
10 See, e.g., Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Evora, No. CIVA.99-12669-WGY, 2000 WI,
1738701, at *6 rt.3 (D. Mass. 2000); Luciano v. U.S., No. 00-CV-1725(FB), 2000 WL 1597771
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Dwyer v. Kislak Mortg. Corp, 13 P.3d 240, 244 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (finding litigant's violation of court's rule prohibiting citation to unpublished deci-
sion worthy of $500 sanction). Nowhere was this citation rule more ignored than the
Eighth Circuit, where Anastasoff I had binding precedential effect. See U.S. v. Goldman 228
F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2000); Conant v. City of Hibbing, 131 F. Supp. 2d. 1129, 1133 n.2
(D. Minn. 2000); U.S. v. Carrillo, 123 F. Stipp. 2d 1223, 1247 (D. Colo. 2000); Snell V. Al-
lianz Life Ins. Co. of North America, No. Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640 at *711.8 (D.
Minn. 2000); In re Arzt, 252 B.R. 138, 142-43 (BAP. 8th Cir. 2000); In mNorkus, 256 B.R.
298, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2000).
11 See Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions C.? the Nature of Precedent,
4 GREEN BAG 2d. 17 (2000); Deborah Jones Merritt &James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law:
What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VANE). L. REV. 71 (2001);
Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000); Re-
cent Case, Constitutional Law—Article III Judicial Power—Eighth Circuit Holds That Unpublished
Opinions Must I3e Accorded Nye:len:la' EffectAnastasoff v. United States, 223 R3d 898 (8th Cir.
2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 940 (2001) (hereinafter "Recent Case").
12 See Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (hereinafter "A nastasoff
In). Since the time that Anastasoff I was decided, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reached an opposite conclusion on the underlying tax issue involved in the Anastasoff I
litigation. See Weisbart v. United States, 222 F.3d 93 (3rd Cir. 2000). The Internal Revenue
Service adopted au institutional position in accordance with Weisbart. See Anastasoff II, 235
F.3d at 1054-55. Having adopted this position, the IRS recognized they no longer had a
valid claim against Ms. Anastasoff and paid her claim with interest. See id. Therefore, at the
time of the en bane rehearing, the government was able to argue successfully that there
was no longer a dispute requiring judicial resolution. See id.
13 See id. at 1056.
"Id.
15 See Schuller v. U.S. Court of Appeals, No. C-00-4076 VRW, 2001 WL 313583, at *4
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2c1 69, 136 (D.
Mass. 2001); MacNeill Eng'g Co. v. Trisport, Ltd., 126 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D. Mass. 2001);
Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Reno, No. C-00-4291 VRW, 2000 WL 1897302 at *3 (N.D. Cal.
2000); Carrillo, 123 F. Supp. 24 at 1247; Luciano, 2000 WL 1597771 at *1.
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While the vacatur of Anastasoff I no longer makes the decision the
force it once was, the debate has been successfully reinvigorated. 18
The continued commentary and judicial action has focused on Article
HI constitutional arguments and remolded policy arguments that
were made pre-Anastasoff. 17
 Like the earlier scholarly debate, however,
new commentary has failed to consider how the rules impair constitu-
tional rights of individual litigants. 18
 This Note will focus on the con-
tention that rules which prohibit the citation of unpublished deci-
sions remove a deeply-rooted common law procedure and, therefore,
deprive litigants of their procedural due process rights. 19
An example of how the inability to cite unpublished authority
might impair a litigant's procedural due process rights may be illustra-
tive. Consider the following hypothetical." Congress passes a new
criminal statute. In an attempt to enforce the new law, the U.S. Attor-
ney charges a defendant for conduct which, although borderline,
likely falls within the purview of the statute. It is a close case, the de-
fendant arguing that the legislature did not intend that he be prose-
cuted for the offenses with which he is charged. The court, however,
disagrees with defendant's contention and allows the trial to proceed.
Defendant is convicted and sentenced to jail. Six months pass and de-
fendant appeals. During the time in which his appeal is being pre-
pared, the federal circuit court of appeals for his jurisdiction decides
a pair of cases relating to the statute. The first case, published in Fed-
eral Reporter; Third Edition, is quite similar to his own, and, as in his
case, the applicability of the statute is upheld. However, in the second
case, which is found in the court clerk's office, a different panel of the
court interprets the applicability of the new statute directly opposite
to the first case.
A young associate working for the defendant finds the latter case
and announces the good news to the partner for whom she is work-
16 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
17 See Price, supra note 11, at 81; Recent Case, supra note 11, at 940.
IS
 See Price, supra 'tote 11, at 81; Recent Case, supra note 11, at 940.
I  See supra notes 235-332 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Note, I am
focusing on the no-citation rules of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. I do this primar-
ily because of the wide and varying scope of state court rules. However, the topics and
arguments discussed in this Note are likely as applicable to state courts as they are to fed-
eral courts. Many state court no-citation rules, therefore, also likely violate procedural due
process.
21)
 This hypothetical is largely a fiction of my imagination. However, the case of Good let
u Commonwealth, introduced me to the potential implications of no-citation rules in the
criminal context and evidences the plausibility of this hypothetical. See 825 S.W.2d 290 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1992).
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Mg. Her excitement turns to dejection, however, as the partner in-
forms her that although the holding and reasoning of the unpub-
lished opinion would be quite helpful, under circuit rules it may not
be cited in the brief that will be submitted to the court. The dejected
associate is baffled: "Do you mean one person goes to jail for an ac-
tion for which another goes free? And we can't even make the court
aware of this inequity by citing the case in our brief?"
One can imagine countless variations of this hypothetical in
which litigants are deprived of life, liberty or property without the
ability to cite to favorable unpublished decisions. They could appear
in both the civil and criminal context. The rules could inhibit corpo-
rations and individuals, plaintiffs and defendants.
Prior to the 1970s, litigants were never deprived of the ability to
cite to cases of any kind—published or unpublished.° It was not until
the enactment of no-citation rules in the 1970s that citation prohibi-
tions took effect. 22 This Note argues that by removing a litigant's abil-
ity to cite to previously decided cases, many Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal violate procedural due process. 25
Section I of this Note will review the historical practice of citation
to judicial decisions, going back more than seven hundred years. 24
This section will detail the practice of citing to previous judicial deci-
sions in pre-American English law and will then show how the English
practice was adopted by early American courts and continued until
the 1970s. 25 Section II will focus on the reasons precipitating the cita-
tion bans and the circumstances surrounding their enactment. 26 This
section will also discuss cases that have challenged the constitutional-
ity of no-citation rules. 27 Section III will discuss Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, which found an abrogation of the traditional common law pro-
cedure for review of punitive damages to be violative of procedural
due process. 28 Finally, Section IV argues by analogy that removal of
the deeply-rooted practice allowing citation to prior cases, like the
removal of the deeply-rooted common law procedure in Honda, vio-
lates procedural due process. 29
RI See infra notes 30-111 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 112-141 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 235-332 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 30-111 and acconipanyittg text.
28
	 infra notes 30-111 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 112-141 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 142-187 and accompanying text.
" See 512 U.S. 415 (1994); infra notes 188-235 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 235-332 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LONG HISTORY OF CITING PRIOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Pre-American English Practice
Relying upon the holdings and reasoning of previous judicial de-
cisions when arguing to the court has a long history in English law."
Past cases have been urged on the court for centuries, even during
times when cases appeared only in loosely collected "Year Books" and
not law reports.3 ' At no time prior to the American Revolution did
English courts prevent litigants from citing or referencing previous
judicial decisions in their arguments to courts."
Beginning in the thirteenth century and continuing into the
middle of the fifteenth century, the common law of England was re-
corded in Year Books." The origin and precise purpose of early Year
Books are uncertain. 34 One theory is that Year- Books began when law-
yers annotated their "bOoks of procedure"—the books they used to
guide them in the pleading of their cases—to keep them up to date as
new decisions were rendered." Another theory is that the Year Books
were kept by law students and junior lawyers who were taking notes in
furtherance of their desire to learn pleading and procedure. 36 Re-
gardless, it is clear that the Year Books were unofficial, not intended to
be comprehensive records of the common law, and not meant to es-
tablish binding precedents. 57 Cases notated in the Year Books, however,
were frequently referenced by the bench and bar in argument of sub-
sequent cases:
"Arguing legal reasoning and judicial conclusions from past cases is, of course, a vital
component of the modern doctrine of stare decisis. See Price, supra note 12, at 94-99; Fre-
derick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987). For the purposes of this
article, however, whether past cases are binding on the court is irrelevant. The argument
set forth in this Note focuses on the ability of litigants to cite past judicial decisions for any
purpose, binding or persuasive.
31 See infra notes 33-56 and acconipanying text.
32 See infra notes 33-56 and acconipanying text.
33 See WALKER & WALKER'S ENGLISH LEGAL Sys-rEst 82 (Richard Ward ed., 8th ed.
1998); PERCY H. WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 145-59
(1925).
14 See WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33, at 82.
35 See T.F.T. Ftnex.NE-rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 268 (5th ed. 1956).
36 See WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33, at 82; Harold J. Berman & Charles Reid, Jr.,
The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 438, 445
(1996); see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 205 (3d ed.
1990).
37 See Berman & Reid, supra note 36, at 495; PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 344.
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There are quite frequent cases in the Year Books where we
find judges or counsel mentioning previous decisions. They
seem generally to quote from memory; sometimes they give
us the names of the parties, but not always. . . . the citation of
a case in point may perhaps be persuasive enough for coun-
sel to think it worth while, but it is certainly not in the least
degree binding."
In the middle of the fifteenth century, the English legal system
ceased using Year Books and began to rely on private legal reporters to
document common law developments in law reports. 39 Initially these
early law reports were quite similar in nature and quality to the exist-
ing Year Books, but soon the quality improved as the reporters became
more detailed and comprehensive in their treatment of the argu-
ments of counsel and judgments of the court.° A noteworthy example
of an early law report is the famous work Coke's Reports, penned by Sir
Edward Coke, which became so• dominant in the English legal com-
munity that it became known simply as "the Report"—a distinction
that remains true today. 41 These early law reports, although not
official, were the primary source of the common law and contained
cases and arguments of law commonly cited by advocates in argu-
ments to the court. 42 In fact, it was at the time Coke wrote his reports
[1572-1616] that citation to precedents became particularly com-
mon.°
Between 1751 and 1772, Burrow's Reports contained the cases of
the Court of the Kings Bench." These reports are considered to be
sE4 PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 344-45; see CARLETON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING
181-82 (5th ed. 1951) ("[T]here is respectable evidence that at least as early as the last
quarter of the thirteenth century the practice of citation of past cases] was frequent in the
legal profession ... [Year Book] [d]ecisions are cited often enough to show that Bench
and Bar consider them a relevant part of argument."); WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33,
at 82 (noting that in 1310 and 1312, judges deciding cases relied on decisions ten and
twenty five years old respectively); see also WINFIELD, SUM note 33, at 145-54. In fact, the
name "Year Book" itself derives from the a method of citation—by regnal year—to the
books used by bench and bar. See id. The value of Year Book cases is evidenced by the fact
that they are still cited in modern English courts. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 345.
39 See Berman & Reid, supra note 36, at 445; WARD, supra note 33, at 82.
49 See WALKER & WALKER'S, SUM note 33, at 83.
41 See Berman & Reid, supra note 36, at 447; DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 314 (1999).
41 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 349; WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33, at 83.
45 See Berman & Reid, supra note 36, at 44; PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 349;
WINFIELD, supra note 33, at 154.
44 See WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33, at 83.
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the first in the modern pattern, ,including headnotes and clearly sepa-
rated sections for the judgment of the court and the arguments of
counse1.45 Not contemporaneous with the decisions, Burrow's Reports
were soon followed by 'Term Reports, covering the years 1785-1800,
which were contemporaneous,46 All of these reporters, though
unofficial, were citable authority in their day, and remain so to the
present.47
Law reports dichotomized in England during the late eighteenth
century into "authorized" and "unauthorized" reports." Judges gave
authorized reporters free access to official court papers, thus allowing
them to produce a more comprehensive report of judicial proceed-
ings.49 Some judges would also review the reports developed by
authorized reporters and make edits prior to their publication. 50
Along with the distinction of being an authorized report came
the status of exclusive citation—the privilege that only decisions
therein may be cited to the court. 51 This distinction was hollow, how-
ever, because if a lawyer , wished to argue to the court a decision not
appearing in an authorized report, he could vouch for the case ap-
pearing in an unauthorized or unpublished report. 52 Once counsel
attested to the case, the Court would automatically accept its validity. 53
This practice existed long before the creation of authorized reports,
dating back to the earliest Year Book decisions.54 Thus, although
authorized reports of the late eighteenth century were given citation
preference by the courts, there was no class of judicial decisions that
could not be cited in arguments to the court.55
In summary: (1) English litigants have been able to cite to the
reasoning or holding of any case previously decided by an English
court since the thirteenth century; (2) the practice of arguing previ-
ous cases to the court existed long before there were legal reporters
collecting and memorializing judicial decisions; (3) citation to all
prior decisions continued after reporters began documenting cases in
45
 See id.
46 see id.
47 See id.
See XV WS. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 248.
45 See XIII id. at 425.
5° See id.
51 See XV id. at 248.
52 See id.
53 See XV WS. HOLDS WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH Law 248.
64 See id.
H See id.
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law reports; and (4) if a particular case was not included in the report,
a lawyer could vouch for the case and its reasoning and holding could
then be used in arguments to the court. 56
B. Citation to Previously Decided Judicial Decisions in America from Colonial
Times to the Late Twentieth Century
No published law reports existed in America during the Colonial
period.57 Moreover, early American lawyers rarely relied upon the
English reports for sources of law. 58 Rather, the early colonists
adopted simplistic legal codes for the administration of justice. 69
However, as the bench and bar began to grow in the Colonies and as
the English government more closely monitored the Colonies' ac-
tions, English common law was more readily received.60 Blackstone's
Commentaries became prevalent in Colonial law practice and the im-
portation of Burrow's Reports from England illustrated the value of an
organized reporting system.61
In 1761, a few colonial lawyers began producing their own law
reports. 62 Between that time and the Revolution, at least three mem-
bers of the bar—Josiah Quincy, Jr., Ephraim Kirby, and Francis Hop-
kinson—kept reports, though the reports were not published until
much later.° Some colonial courts also kept their own state reports
with cases going back as early as 1658.64 Like the reports of Quincy,
Kirby, and Hopkinson, the state reports also were not published until
long after the Revolution. 65 Unaware of these reports, most pre-
Revolution colonial lawyers wishing to argue past judicial decisions to
56 See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text.
57 See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 130 (3d ed.
1942); Daniel R. Coquillette, First Flower—The Earliest Law Reports and the Extraordinary
Josiah Quincy Jr., 30 Surrota U. L. REv. 1,11.3 (1996).
65 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 130 (noting that of the approximately 150 English law
reports existing at the time, only about half had been imported to the colonies, and a
mere thirty were commonly used); MORTON j. HOROWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-18604-6 (1977).
59 SeellicKs, supra note 57, at 130; HoRowrrz, supra note 58, at 4-6.
60 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 130.
61 See id.; DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3-8 (1941).
62 See Coquillette, supra note 57, at 1 ti:3.
65 See id. The reports of Kirby and Hopkinson were both published shortly after the
revolution in 1789. See id. However, Quincy's were not published until they were later dis-
covered in 1865. See id.
64 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 132. The first of these state reports was published in
1790, but most remained unpublished until the 1800s.
65 See id.
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courts relied on cases included in the English law commentaries and
law reports.66 These lawyers also cited to early cases of the colonial
courts, relying on their memories to recall the reasoning or holding
of prior judicial decisions.°
Following the Revolution, no official reporting system existed for
the early American courts, yet American litigants wished to argue the
holdings of those courts in subsequent cases." Many lawyers contin-
ued to cite to English cases decided prior to 1776, but felt that be-
cause America was newly independent, its courts should not rely upon
English cases decided after 1776. 69 Courts agreed, and, indeed, after
the Revolution, states such as New Jersey, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware temporarily prohibited citation to English cases decided af-
ter July 4, 1776."
Lacking American law reports containing precedent, post-
independence lawyers began keeping their own reports of cases. 71
These personal reports or notebooks were comparable to the some-
what haphazardly collected Year Books of fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
tury England and contained only the personal recollections of the
individual attorneys." The lack of a formal reporting system did not,
however, prevent litigants from using the reasoning and conclusions
of early American cases when arguing to the court." Lawyers were
allowed to cite to legal principles from prior decisions without docu-
mentation, even if the decisions were only in the memory of the law-
yers or in their personal memoranda. 74
A more organized and comprehensive reporting system soon de-
veloped as private reporters began publishing law reports." Between
1789 and 1803, sixteen different private reporters began publishing
66 See LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (L. Kinivin Wroth Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965);
BOORSTIN, supra note 61, at 3-8.
67 See LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 66, at L; SUSAN W. BRENNER, PRECEDENT INFLATION 83
(1992); ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 38 (1990).
" See BRENNER, supra note 67, at 83-84; HICKS, supra note 57, at 132.
65 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 132.
70 ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1776-1836,
at 41 (1969); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 11 (1974).
71 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 282 (1973); Molts, supra
note 57, at 133.
72 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 282; HICKS, supra note 57, at 133.
73 See PETER KARSTEN, HEART V. HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEEN -Ili-CENTURY
AMERICA 28-32 (1997); SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 38.
74 See KARSTEN, supra note 73, at 28-32; Frederick G Ken ►/Jilt, Jr., Precedent and Stare De-
cisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 An. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 37-38 (1959); SURRENCY,
supra note 67, at 38.
75 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 135; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 39.
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law reports in eight different states." All of these reports were
unOfficial. 77 However, because of the high regard in which the report-
ers—including luminaries such as Chipman, Root and Kirby—were
held, the reports were universally accepted as authentic." Moreover,
cases included in these reports were extensively relied upon and fre-
quently cited by lawyers and judges of this period."
In 1803, the reporting system of the American courts progressed
further as states began publishing official reports. 8° Many states passed
statutes requiring their highest courts to appoint reporters to monitor
cases and report those considered important to the development of
the common law." In addition to governmental efforts, unofficial re-
ports continued to be privately produced. 82 The combination of
unofficial and official reports meant most states had a workable sys-
tem of law reports in place between 1803 and 1834. 85 During this
time, lawyers were free to cite either the official or unofficial reports
when arguing past cases to the court. 84 Additionally, lawyers relied on
cases not appearing in reports, instead using their personal notes or
those of another attorney for the points they wished to argue. 85
From 1830 to 1871, official and unofficial law reports were pub-
lished on a state-by-state basis with little coordination or sense of a
broader system,86 During this period, however, litigation over the
copyright of officially produced judicial opinions ensued, creating risk
for unofficial reporters who were increasingly reliant upon the tran-
scripts produced by official reporters.° In Wheaton v. Peters, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that although official reporters may copy-
right headnotes and other independently produced commentary,
anyone had the right to publish portions of the judicial opinions
76 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 135; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 39.
" See HICKS, supra note 57, at 135; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 39.
78 See FRANCIS AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 74-76 (1969);
HICKS, supra note 57, at 135; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 39.
79 See Mots, supra note 57, at 135; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 39.
aoSeeAustANN, supra note 78, at 77; Mots, supra note 57, at 136.
II See HICKS, supra note 57, at 136-37; Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-Ametiran Legal Citation:
Historical Developments and Libra?) , Implications, 75 Law Lim. J. 3,18 (1982).
sp Seellicxs, supra note 57, at 136-37.
83 See id. at 138.
84 See id.; JAMES RAM, SCIENCE OF LEGAL JUDGMENT 28-29 (1834).
86 See RAM, supra note 84, at 28-29 ("A manuscript note of a case is authority. It may be
more full, or accurate, than a printed report of the same case. The existence of such
manuscript may be little known. When cited by a party in a cause, it may be . an author-
ity precisely applicable.") (internal citations and quotation omitted).
86 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 138.
87 See id.
706	 Boston College Law Review
	
(Vol. 42:695
themselves.88
 As a result of this decision, official reporters faced profit
pressure from insurgent unofficial reporters, causing many courts
overseeing the official reporters to insist that only official law reports
be cited in arguments to their courts. 89
The courts' favor for official reports, however, created only pref-
erence, not preclusion." If a decided case was included in both the
official and unofficial reports, the courts insisted on citation to the
official report. 91 If the case did not appear in the official report, how-
ever, lawyers were free to cite to the unofficial report and argue the
decision to the court. 92 Therefore, although some courts created a
presumption favoring 'citation to official reports, this preference did
not create a class of uncitable cases."
In 1871, legal reporters became more systematic and assumed a
style and organization that continues to be used today. 94 These im-
proved reports included indexes, digests, and timely publication of
cases soon after the rendering of a decision.95 A nationwide system of
reporting in this new format began to develop in 1876, including re-
ports covering cases on a regional basis." This system, known as the
National Reporter System, was fueled by the aggressive sales efforts of
John West and his West Publishing Company, which remains intact
today.97
C. Law Reports and Case Citation in the Lower Federal Courts
In 1875, the federal district courts and circuit courts 98 assumed
jurisdiction over all federal matters described in the Constitution."
Prior to the expansion of federal jurisdiction, the role of the federal
" See id.; 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
" See Hicxs, supra note 57, at 138.
99
 See id. at 139,143.
91 See id.
92 See id.
95 See id; Ram, supra note 84, at 28-29.
94 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 140.
95 See id.
" See HICKS, supra note 57, at 145-46; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 49.
97 See BRENNER, supra note 67, at 86-88; Mots, supra note 57, at 145-46; SURRENCY,
supra note 67, at 49.
" The Federal Circuit Courts of 1875 should not be confused with today's circuit
courts of appeal. See SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 61. The circuit courts, like today's district
courts, were primarily federal trial courts. See id. Although the circuit courts also heard
occasional appeals of district court decisions, this was not their primary duty. See id. Circuit
courts were abolished in 1912. See id.
99 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 140-41; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 61.
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courts was circumscribed, focusing primarily on cases of admiralty. 1°
Likely because of the limited importance and jurisdiction of the early
federal courts, their judicial opinions were not widely circulated and
were found only in practitioners' notebooks and a few private law re-
ports."' Lawyers involved in litigation in those courts cited to both
the published private law reports and their unpublished notebooks
when arguing past judicial decisions to the court. 182
Beginning in 1880, West Publishing Company began publishing
the Federal Reporterlo This report was constructed in modern form—
including headnotes, indexes and digests—and initially included the
decisions of the federal district and circuit courts.'" The Federal Re-
porter's coverage then expanded to include the Federal Circuit Courts
Of Appeal at their inception in 1891. 1 °8 Years later, in 1932, the re-
ports of the decisions of the federal courts were divided, with the de-
cisions of the district courts being published in the Federal Supplement
and the decisions of the circuit courts of appeal continuing to be pub-
lished in the Federal Reporterl°
West Publishing Company took a so-called "blanket approach" to
its publication of the Federal Reporter by comprehensively publishing all
decisions, written and oral, issued by the circuit courts of appeal.' 87
Because all judicial decisions were included in the Federal Reporter,
there was never a concern over whether litigants were citing "pub-
lished" or "unpublished," "authorized" or "unauthorized" judicial de-
cisions to the court. 308 All of the decisions that needed to be cited
100 See SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 61.
101 See id.; HICKS, supra note 57, at 142.
102 See HICKS, supra note 57, at 132-37; SURRENCY, supra note 67, at 61.
1 °3 HICKS, supra note 57, at 141-42.
104 See id.
106 See id.; 47 FEDERAL REPORTER i (1892) (the first edition of the Federal Reporter to in-
clude the Federal Circuit Courts Of Appeals).
106 See id.
107 See RICHARD A, POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 163 (1996); Robert C. herring, Legal Re-
search and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 15, 21 (1987); Thomas
A. Woxland, "Forever Associated with the Practice of Law": The Early Years of the West Publishing
Company, 5 LEGAL REF. SERVICES Q. 115, 123-24 (Spring 1985); Thomas J. Young A
Look at American Law Reporting in the 19th Century, 68 LAW L/BR. J. 294, 302-03 (1975); see
also 1 FEDERAL REPORTER 3 (1880) (the preface to the first Federal Reporter states: 'The Fed-
eral Reporter is devoted exclusively to the prompt and complete publication of the judicial
opinions.") (emphasis added).
1°8 See POSNER, supra note 107, at 163; herring, supra note 107, at 15, 21; Woxland, su-
pra note 107, at 123-24; Young, supra note 107, at 302-03.
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were included in the published Federal Reporten 109 Therefore, citation
limitations, preferences, or prohibitions played no role at the incep-
tion of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appea1. 110
 It was not until later,
when court rules allowed unpublished decisions and prohibited or
limited their citation that uncitable cases starting appearing in the
circuit courts of appeal.in
II. ABANDONMENT OF THE COMMON LAW PRACTICE OF ALLOWING
CITATION TO ALL PRIOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. The Process and Policies Behind the Abrogation
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal
were faced with a crisis." 2
 The number of cases they were called upon
to decide was rising dramatically without corresponding increases in
the number of judges or judicial staff." The added burden created
severe case ,backlogs, often meaning substantial delays in the time it
took to render and issue judicial decisions.'" The increasing caseload
also meant that the sheer volume of precedent was becoming unman-
ageably large." 5
 The legal community generally, and the judiciary
particularly, feared that as court decisions filled more and more law
reports, it would become increasingly difficult for judges and lawyers
to locate the appropriate decisions to serve as precedents for their
current cases. 116
 Additionally, commentators thought it would be al-
most impossible for lawyers, judges, or law professors to remain cur-
rent on the state of the law, as it was practicable to monitor only a
bare minimum of judicial decisions.'"
The Judicial Conference of the United States responded to the
rising caseloads and burgeoning law reports by issuing a general rec-
ommendation at their 1964 meeting that judges publish only those
I® See POSNER, supra note 107, at 163; Berring, supra note 107, at 15, 21; Woxland, su-
pra note 107, at 123-24; Young, supra note 107, at 302-03; See also FEDERAL REPORTER, su-
pra note 107, at 3.
110 See Berring, supra note 107, at 15, 21; Woxland, supra note 107, at 123-24; Young,
supra note 107, at 302-03.
ut See infra notes 112-141 and accompanying text.
I " See DRAGICH, supra note 5, at 761; REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1167-68.
115 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1167-68.
114 See id.
l it See id. at 1169-70; seegenerally Leah F. Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication
of Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 Law LIBR. J. 362 (1974).
116 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1169-70.
117 See id. at 1169.
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opinions "of general precedential value." 118 In reaction, the Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice ("ACAP"), a group comprised of both
federal and state appeals court judges and administrators, issued a
report urging appellate courts to adopt rules that would reduce the
number of published appellate opinions."9 The ACAP urged consid-
eration of the following criteria when deciding whether to publish an
opinion: (1) whether the decision created a new rule of law or altered
an existing one; (2) whether the decision involved a legal issue of on-
going public interest; (3) whether the decision criticized existing law;
or (4) whether the decision resolved a conflict of authority. 12° If an
opinion met one of these criteria, it was to be published; if not, the
decision was to be designated "not for publication." 121 Since the issu-
ance of the ACAP report, all of the federal circuit court's of appeal
have enacted limited publication rules. 122
Coupled with limited publication rules, the circuit courts of ap-
peal also enacted "no-citation rules," which limited the ability of liti-
gants to cite to unpublished judicial decisions. 123 The citation limita-
tions, which were also recommended by the ACAP, were viewed as a
necessary companion to the limited publication rule for two rea-
sons. 124 First, the unpublished opinions were meant solely for the par-
118 1964 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 11.
112 ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON USE OF APPELLATE
COURT ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL. OPINIONS 1 (1973); see also
MARTINEAU, supra note 5, at 122 (stating that this was a joint effort of the state and federal
courts).
122 SeeADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 119, at 15-17.
121 See id. In current practice, the writing judge typically makes the decision regarding
publication. See Jerome I. Braun, Eighth Circuit Decision Intensifies Debate Over Publication and
Citation of Appellate Opinions, 84 JUDICATURE 90 (2000) (stating that in practice if one judge
on panel wants an opinion published, other judges defer); Arnold, supra note 4, at 221
(stating that in practice, Eighth Circuit publication decisions are made by the writing
judge).
122 See D.C. Cm. R.'28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD CIR. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; FOURTH Cm. R. 36(c); Firm CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR.
R. 28(g); SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); EIGHTH CIR. R. 28(a) (i); NINTH CIR. R.
36-3 (b)(iii); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2; see also Berg, supra
note 8, (page unavailable) (finding that most state appellate courts also enacted limited
publication and no-citation practices).
122 See Martin, supra note 5, at 177; see also D.C. Cm. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST
CIR. R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R. 0.23; THIRD Cut. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; FOURTH CIR. R.
36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e);
EIGHTH CIR. R. 28(a) (i); NINTH CIR. R. 36-3 (b) (iii); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2);
ELEVENTH Cm. R. 36-2.
124 See Martineau, supra note 5, at 125-26; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5, at 1179,
1185-87.
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ties to a particular case. 125
 By virtue of the opinion's unpublished
status, the case created no new law contributing to common law de-
velopment and thus was not worthy of citation. 126 Second, and more
importantly, because the unpublished decisions were only meant for
the parties to the case, the reasoning and writing in them was not of
the same quality as those widely-circulated opinions that were desig-
nated for publication. 127 With no-citation rules, judges could be com-
fortable knowing that their lower-quality unpublished decisions would
only be relied upon by the parties to the case, and could thus save
time and judicial resources by performing a less comprehensive sur-
vey and explanation of the law than that which would typically ac-
company a published decision. 128 One judge noted that in compari-
son to the preparation of a published decision, "my clerks and I spend
about half as much time working on the average unpublished deci-
sion.”129 Judges feared that if their decisions, in spite of their unpub-
lished status, could be cited in subsequent cases, they would pay more
attention to the quality of the reasoning and writing in the opinions
and mitigate the time-savings associated with the opinion's unpub-
lished status.'"
Federal circuit courts of appeal rules limiting or prohibiting the
citation of unpublished decisions have taken various forms. 151 Today,
the majority of the rules prohibit all citation to unpublished deci-
sions, except in cases where the citation is made to support a claim of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.'" The First Circuit
Court of Appeals rule, for example, states that: "[u] npublished opin-
ions may be cited only in related cases. Only published opinions may
125 See Martineau, supra note 5, at 125-26; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5, at 1186.
' 26 SeeADvisowe COUNCIL, supra note 119, at 15-17.
127 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, 510117 note 5, at 1186.
128 See id.; MARTIN, supra note 5, at 193-94.
120 See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 190.
130 See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 193-94; REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1186.
But cf., Merritt & Brudney, supra note 11, at 114 (finding that those circuit courts of appeal
that allow for persuasive citation of unpublished judicial decisions saw a decrease in publi-
cation rates, meaning that judges saved time and judicial resources by preparing fewer
published opinions).
131 See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. Cut. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR, R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD CIR. R. IOP 5.8 & 6.2; FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. It 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR.
R. 28(g); StvEnrrit Cm. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); EIGHTH CIR. R. 28(a) (i); NINTH Cm. R.
36-3 (b) (iii); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH Cm. R. 36-2.
132 See D.C. Cm, IL 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST Cm. R. 36 (b) (2)(F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD CIR. R. IOP 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); NINTH CIR. R.
36-3 (b) (iii).
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be cited otherwise."'" Other circuits allow for the citation of unpub-
lished decisions, but only as persuasive, not binding, authority.'"
In practice, the combination of no-citation and limited publica-
tion rules allow judges in most circuits to decide—through their deci-
sions regarding publication—which of their opinions will have prece-
dential effect in future cases. 136 If judges do not wish their decisions to
be cited in future cases, under most circuit court rules, they can sim-
. ply designate their opinions as not for publication. 136 Thus, in more
than half the circuits, a judge's unpublished designation means that
the opinion can never again—except in infrequent instances of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case—be argued to the
court, l37
No-citation rules also bestow unpublished opinions a unique
status: they are typically the only written source that—by rule—cannot
be cited in court documents.'" None of the circuit court rules pro-
hibit litigants from citing to English cases, newspaper articles, interna-
tional treaties, legislative histories, treatises and hornbooks, dictionar-
ies, law review and journal articles, and even the works of
philosophers and playwrights.' 36 To add further irony, under the
rules, many of these citable sources can themselves extensively discuss
unpublished opinions while still serving as citable authority: 1413 In sum,
courts will consider nearly any written matter a litigant wishes to urge
133 FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2)(F).
"4 See FOURTH Cm. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); Emu -tit Cut.
R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(13) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2.
135 See Braun, supra note 121, at 90; Arnold, supra note 5, at 223.
1 " See Braun, supra note 121, at 90; Arnold, supra note 5, at 221.
"7 See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD C1R, R. IOP 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); NINTH CIR. R.
36-3 (b) (iii).
1 " See D.C. Cur. R. 28(c); FED. Cut. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (14 (2) (F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD CIR. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); Firm Cm. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR,
R. 28(g); SEVENTH C/R, R. 53(b) (2) ( (iv) & 53(e); EIGHTH Cut. R. 28(a) (i); NINTH C1R, R.
36-3 (b) (iii); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH Cur. R. 36-2.
139 See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2001) (court re-
sponding to defendant's use of Shakespeare's King Lear as persuasive authority).
140 See, e.g., Henderson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 157 F.3d 106, 119 (2nd
Cir. 1998). Henderson cites a Harvard Law Review Note, which cites an unpublished judicial
decision. See id. at 119, citing, Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and Preservation
of Judicial Review: Federal Court Thatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1578, II. 65, citing, Rasa v. Senkowski, No. 97 CIV. 2468 (RWS), 1997 WI.. 436484, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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upon them, except for the portions of their own craft that they desig-
nate as "not for publication."lo
B. Constitutional Challenges to No-Citation Rules
Courts began considering legal challenges to limited publication
and no-citation rules almost immediately after the rules were en-
acted. 142 Most of these early challenges were based on claims that
rules limiting citation to unpublished decisions were unconstitu-
tional. 143
 In spite of these early challenges, it was not until 2000, that a
court found no-citation rules to be unconstitutional.' 44
In Jones v. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that litigants have a right
to cite to the unpublished opinions of the court." 5 The court noted,
"[wje concede, of course, that any decision is by definition a prece-
dent, and that we cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to urge
upon us what we have previously done." 146 The court, however; went
on to say that because access to unpublished decisions is limited, it
would strongly prefer that litigants not cite the decisions. 147 Further,
the court proclaimed that the court itself would not cite unpublished
decisions in drafting their written opinions.'" In effect, therefore, the
court expressed that it would not give unpublished decisions prece-
dential effect, but it could not prohibit litigants from arguing such
decisions to the court. 149 However, the Jones court gave no constitu-
tional justification for why it believed litigants had a right to cite to
prior unpublished decisions.m
141 The portion of judicial decisions designated "not for publication" is large. See 2000
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR ON THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
TABLE S-3 (2000) available at hItp://wwutuscourts.gov/jndbus2000/conlents.html . In 2000,
79.8% of the judicial decisions of the circuit courts of appeal were designated not for pub-
lication. See id. This percentage ranged front a low of 56.5% in the Seventh Circuit, to a
high of 90.5% in the Fourth Circuit. See id.
142 See Dunn, supra note 6, at 141-45 (reviewing early challenges to limited publication
and no-citation rules).
145 See id.
144 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en banc,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
145 See 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972).
146 Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
147 See id.
"a See id.
149 see id.
15° See Jones, 465 F.2d at 1094.
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Shortly after Jones, the Supreme Court of the United States twice
received requests to rule on the constitutionality of no-citation
rules. 151 First, in Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, the Court was asked to grant the petitioners leave to
file writs of mandamus and prohibition so that the Court could rule
on the constitutionality of the Seventh Circuit's no-citation rule. 152 In
the underlying case, the Seventh Circuit had struck the petitioners'
reference to an unpublished decision because it violated the circuit's
citation ban. 153 In their petition for leave, the Do-Right petitioners ar-
gued that precluding them from citing unpublished authority violated
their free speech rights, impinged on their ability to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances, and deprived them of fair and
equal administration of justice. 154 The Supreme Court denied peti-
tioners motion for leave. 155
The Supreme Court next faced the constitutionality of no-
citation rules a year later in Browder v. Director' In Browder, the peti-
tioner argued that the Seventh Circuit's refusal to publish their deci-
sion infringed upon their right to gain further appellate review. 157
Specifically, petitioners argued that the Seventh Circuit's holding in
their case conflicted with an earlier published Seventh Circuit deci-
sion. 158 Because, however, the petitioners' case was unpublished and
uncitable, the en banc panel would not recognize an intra-circuit
conflict requiring resolution. 159
The Browder Court was able to avoid ruling on the constitutional-
ity of the no-citation rules. Rather, the Court found that the Seventh
Circuit lacked jurisdiction to deCide the underlying dispute. 16° There-
151 See Dunn, supra note 6, at 142.
152 See 429 U.S. 91 .7 (1976) (denying motion for leave); Dunn, supra note 6, at 142.
153 See Dunn, supra note 6. at 142.
154 See id. (citing Petitioners' Brief on Support of Motion for Leave to File a Petition for
Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition at 8, Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976)).
155 Do-Right, 429 U.S. at 917. Notably, however, at least one commentator has opined
that the Supreme Court's denial of the motion resulted more from the lack of a continu-
ing controversy and amendments to the Seventh Circuit citation rule, than the constitu-
tional merits of the petitioner's claim. See Dunn, supra note 6, at 143.
156 See434 U.S. 257 (1978).
157 See Brief for Petitioner Ben Earl Browder at 51, Browder v. Director, 434 U.S. 257
(1978).
158 See id.
152 See id.
15° See Browder,  434 U.S. at 258.
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fore, the Court left questions of the validity of the Seventh Circuit's
unpublished opinion and no-citation rules "to another day." 161
Following Browder, it was many years before a federal court again
addressed the constitutionality of no-citation rules. In 1986, Chief
Judge Holloway of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, joined by two of her colleagues, dissented from the Tenth
Circuit's decision to adopt a rule stating that unpublished opinions
have no precedential effect and should not be cited. 162
 The dissenters
found the proponent's arguments in support of the rule unpersuasive
and pointedly addressed the rule's constitutional implications:
No matter how insignificant a prior ruling might appear to be to us,
any litigant who can point to a prior decision of the court and dem-
onstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should be able to do so
as a matter of essential justice and fundamental fairness. To deny a
litigant this right may well have overtones of a constitutional in-
fringement because of the arbitrariness, irrationality, and unequal
treatment of the rule.t63
Fourteen years later, a federal court again addressed the constitu-
tional implications of no-citation rules in Anastasoff 1.164 Only then, for
the first time, did a court rule that no-citation rules were unconstitu-
tional.165 In Anastasoff I, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had to decide whether Faye Anastasoffs tax refund
demand was timely mailed. 166 The time requirements in the Tax Code
conflicted with those under the so-called "mailbox rule" in traditional
contract law. 167 An earlier unpublished decision—Christie v. United
States168—would have dictated a ruling against Anastasoff. 169 Anasta-
soff argued, however, that because Christie was unpublished, the deci-
sion was not binding on the parties or the court under Eighth Circuit
Rule 28(a) (i). 178 The court rejected Anastasoff's argument, holding
161 id.
162 See In Re Rules of United States Court of Appeal Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 37
(10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, J. dissenting). Ironically, though this decision was rendered in ,
November, 1986, it remained unpublished until February, 1992. See id.
165 Id. at 37.
'" See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 898.
165 See id.
166 Id.
167 See id.
166 No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. 1992).
169 See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 899.
176 See id. Rule 28(a) (i), reads as follows:
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that Christie was valid and citable precedent because Rule 28(i) was an
unconstitutional expansion of the federal judiciary's Article III pow-
ers. 171 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit concluded that federal courts
had no constitutional power to issue non-citable, and, therefore, non-
precedential, opinions.'"
The unanimous Eighth Circuit panel examined the historical
status of judicial power in precedential development.'" It found that
the doctrine of precedent dated back to early England where the use
of precedents had been a valuable part of using the rule of law to
guard against the arbitrary power of government. 174 Further, the
Eighth Circuit stated, the doctrine of precedent was so pervasive that
it was at the core of the historic method of judicial decision-making
and that judges used that method as "a bulwark of judicial independ-
ence in past struggles for liberty."'"
The Eighth Circuit noted that in early America, precedent was
viewed as the basic way that judging was carried out, and as such, the
practice was known to the Framers at the time of the Constitutional
Convention.'" Hence, when the Framers crafted the provisions of the
Constitution granting power to the judiciary—Article HI—they were
aware of the importance of precedent and the powerful role it could
play in checking other usurpatious branches of government. 177 The
Framers also thought that judicial decisions would become binding
precedents and that, over a period of time, the number of precedents
would swell to create a massive body of law.'" More pointedly, the
Citation of Unpublished Opinion. Unpublished opinions are not precedent
and parties generally should not cite to them. When relevant to establishing
the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, how-
ever, the parties may cite an unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an
unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve
as well. A party who cites an unpublished opinion for the first time at oral ar-
gument must attach a copy of the unpublished opinion to the supplemental
authority letter required by FRAP 28(j). When citing an unpublished opin-
ion, a party must indicate the opinion's unpublished status.
Eighth Cir. Rule 28(a) (i).
' 7 ' See Anastasoffl, 223 F.3d at 903.
"2 See ed.
173 See id. at 900.
174 See id.
173 Id.
176 See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 900-01.
"7 Id.
1713 Id. at 902.
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Framers envisioned that like cases would be decided alike. 179 The
Anastasoff I court cited Alexander Hamiltion, who specifically com-
mented that "to avoid arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispen-
sable that [the courts] •should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them . ."180 The Eighth Circuit
admitted that the Framers never imagined the publication of judicial
opinions but, nevertheless, judges and lawyers of the day "recognized
the authority of unpublished decisions even when they were estab-
lished only by memory or by a lawyer's unpublished memoran-
dum."181
The Anastasoff I court concluded that the need for courts to fol-
low their precedents has been long understood to derive from the
nature of judicial power itself and has served to separate it from the
power of the legislature. 182 Specifically, the doctrine of precedent has
served as a limit on the judicial power delegated to the courts under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.I 83 Therefore, according to the
court, the Eighth Circuit rule allowing judges to determine which
cases will have precedential effect impermissibly expanded the Article
III powers of the judiciary, removed the liberty check of binding
precedent, and was consequently unconstitutional.'"
After Anastasoff I, litigants throughout the country began citing
favorable unpublished opinions, using Anastasoff I and its Article III
arguments as authority to do so. 185 Thus, although Anastasoff I is no
longer good law, it is likely only a matter of time before another
179
 See id.
idc Id. at 902.
181 Anastasoffl, 223 F.3d at 903.
182 See id. at 903-04.
I" See id.
I&' See id. at 904.
183 See U.S. v. Goldman 228 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2000); Schuller v. U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit, No. C-00.-4076 VRW, 2001 WL 313583, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Am-
gen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 136 (D. Mass. 2001); Mac-
Neill Eng'g Co. v. Trisport, Ltd., 126 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D. Mass. 2001); Alvarenga-
Villalobos v. Reno, No. C-00-4291 VRW, 2000 WL 1897302 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Conant
v. City of Hibbing, 131 F. Supp. 2d. 1129, 1133 11.2 (D. Minn. 2000); U.S. v. Carrillo, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1247 (D. Colo. 2000); Such v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North America, No.
Civ. 97-2784 RLE, 2000 WL 1336640 at *7 n.8 (D. Minn. 2000); Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency v. Evora, No. CIVA.99-12669-WGY, 2000 WL 1738701, at *6 11.3 (D. Mass.
2000); Luciano v. U.S., No. 00-CV-1725 (FS), 2000 WL 1597771 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re
Arzt, 252 B.R. 138, 142-43 (BA.P. 8th Cir. 2000); In re Norkus, 256 B.R. 298, 305 (Sankt•.
S.D. Iowa 2000); Dwyer v. Kislak Mortg. Corp, 13 P.3d 240, 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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larly-postured case takes its place.'" Further, because no- or limited-
citation rules are pervasive, and circuits are likely to be split with re-
spect to Anastasoff Is Article III argument, future Supreme Court re-
view of the rules appears likely. 187
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND HONDA MOTOR CO.
v. OBERG
The prominence of Anastasoff I and the likelihood of continued
litigation over the issues it presented will almost certainly lead courts
to consider the constitutional implications of no-citation rules." 8
While the logical starting point for such an inquiry lies in the Article
III arguments made in Anastasoff I, procedural due process arguments
could prove more successful.'" Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg and its prog-
eny serve as the backbone for a procedural due process challenge to
rules prohibiting citation to unpublished authority.'" These cases
have held that the abrogation of a deeply-rooted common law proce-
dure, without adequate replacement or justification, is violative of
procedural due process."'
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution require that no person he
deprived "of life, liberty or property without due process of law."192
Courts have interpreted these clauses to have two components—one
substantive arid one procedural. 193 On the procedural side, the Due
Process Clauses guarantee that people who are to be deprived of life,
liberty or property, are entitled to a reasonable level of judicial or
administrative process. 194 In determining what is reasonable process,
the U.S. Supreme Court has used traditional practice as "the touch-
' 86 See Goldman 228 F.3cl at 944; Schmier; 2001 WL 313583, at *4; Amgen, 126 F. Stipp. 2d
at 136; MacNeil, 126 F. Stipp. 2c1 at 58; Alvarenga-Villalobos, 2000 WL 1897302 at 1"3; Conant,
131 F. Supp. 2d. at 113311.2; Carrillo, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1247; Snell, 2000 WL 1336640 at *7
n.8; Evora, 2000 WL 1738701, at *6 11.3; Luciano, 2000 WL 1597771 at *1; Arzt, 252 B.R. at
142-43; Norkus, 256 B.R. at 305; Duryea; 13 P.3d at 244.
187 See Mauro, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe "En
banc treatment or a grant of cert (by the Supreme Court) seein[s) fairly likely.")
1e8 See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 235-332 and accompanying text.
190 See512 U.S. 415 (1994).
191 See id.
183 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, XIV.
193 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §13.1 (6th Ed.
2000).
194 See id. at 544.
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stone for constitutional analysis." 195 Because of the deep historical
roots of common law procedures, the Supreme Court has found them
to be fundamental to judicial process and due process of law, and,
thus, has looked disfavorably upon their removal. 196
Cases in which the Supreme Court has been called upon to con-
sider the constitutionality of abrogated common law procedures are
infrequent, as courts and legislatures rarely find need to remove tradi-
tional common law judicial procedures. 197 Starting in the late nine-
teenth century, however, the Supreme Court began deciding a small
series of cases in which it considered whether the removal of a deeply-
rooted common law judicial procedure, without adequate replace-
ment, violated litigants' procedural due process rights. 198 The most
recent addition to the "deeply rooted" line of cases came in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg. 199
In Honda, the Supreme Court held that the removal of a deeply-
rooted judicial procedure, without proper justification or adequate
replacement, violates a litigant's procedural due process rights. 200
 The
Court in Honda first reviewed English and early American legal his-
tory and determined that thorough review of punitive damage awards
was a judicial procedure that was deeply rooted in the common law.201
Having found the practice to be deeply rooted, the Court next de-
termined that the procedure in the instant case, which did not pro-
vide as thorough a review as that which traditionally existed at com-
mon law, thus departed from deeply-rooted common law
procedure. 202 This departure created an insurmountable presumption
of unconstitutionality because there was no adequate replacement
procedure and no societal transformation justifying the departure.2°5
The procedure at issue in Honda was a provision of the Oregon Con-
stitution prohibiting judicial review of punitive damage awards "unless
the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the
195 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
196 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430.
197 See id.
198 See id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Tuiney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Thirtado,
110 U.S. 516.
199 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 430.
205 See id. at 431.
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verdict."204 Honda argued that the inability to seek full judicial re-
view—particularly review for excessiveness—of an adverse verdict de-
prived them of procedural due proCess. 206
Using traditional practice as the touchstone for its analysis, the
Honda majority began by reviewing English and early American legal
history.206 The court found that judicial review of punitive damage
awards dated to eighteenth century England where the Court of
Common Pleas found that it was appropriate for the court to review a
potentially excessive punitive damage award and that in doing so, it
had power to grant a new trial. 207
The English process of judicial review followed settlers to the
United States where American common law courts continued to pro-
vide judicial review of punitive damages, often striking excessive jury
awards as a result. 208 Thorough judicial review remained constant
throughout the nineteenth century as judges reviewed excessive dam-
age awards for "partiality" or "passion and prejudice," often resulting
in the granting of new trials. 209 This level of review continued into the
twentieth century and took root in all modern federal and state
courts, except Oregon. 21° Because judicial review of excessive punitive
damage awards went back nearly three hundred years, the Court
deemed the process to be one deeply rooted in common law judicial
procedure. 211
The next question addressed by the Court was whether Oregon's
standard of punitive damage review, which was limited to awards in
which there was no basis in evidence to support the verdict, conflicted
with deeply-rooted common law practice. 212 The Court rejected the
state's argument that its procedure still allowed for meaningful judi-
cial review and its contention that its procedure, like the common law
practice, could eliminate excessive awards. 213 Contrarily, the court
stated that "unlike the common law, [Oregon] provides no assurance
2°4 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 918.
20 See id.
206 See id. at 421.
2°7 See id.
2" See id. at 424.
209 Honda, 512 U.S. at 425-26.
210 see id.
233 See id.
232 See id. at 926.
213 See id. at 928-29.
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that those whose conduct is sanctionable by punitive damages are not
subjected to punitive damages of arbitrary amounts."214
Oregon's removal of the common law judicial review protection
created a presumption of unconstitutionality. 215 The Court did, how-
ever, recognize that presumptions of unconstitutionality could be
overcome and that "not all deviations from established procedures
result in constitutional infirmity."216
 After all, "to hold all procedural
change unconstitutional would be to deny every quality of law but its
age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement."217
The Court, therefore, had to determine whether Oregon's abro-
gation of the deeply-rooted practice of judicial review of punitive
damages was justifiable. 218
 In doing so, the Court considered whether
Oregon's departure accorded with other cases in which the Court had
allowed common law departures that either: (I) resulted from societal
transformation necessitating change; or (2) were replaced by an ade-
quate substitute procedure. 219
Oregon's unique punitive damage review standard did not com-
port with other Supreme Court cases allowing for departure from
common law practice. 22° In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 221 the
Court allowed for the imposition of personal jurisdiction in a way that
departed from traditional common law practice.222 The International
Shoe Court held that the rise of the corporate entity, capable of doing
business in a state without a physical presence, created jurisdictional
problems not envisioned by rules created in previous generations. 225
214
 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 429.
215 Id. at 430.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 430-31 (internal quotes omitted).
218 See id. at 931.
219
 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430-31.
229 See id.
221
 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
222 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 930-31.
225
 Id.; see International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-20 (finding that traditionally courts con-
sidering jurisdiction found that "[T]o require the corporation in such circumstances to
defend the suit away front its home or other jurisdiction where it carries more substantial
activities ... lay[s] too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport
with due process ..."; however, given the growth of corporate activity outside its home
state, it is "reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which [the corporation]
has incurred ...."); see also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990)
("In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation
and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an
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Moreover, improvements in transportation and communication made
distant litigation more manageable. 224 Therefore, allowing the exten-
sion of state jurisdiction over those not physically present in the state
was a common law development, necessary to afford litigants' redress
for their grievances and not violative of due process. 225
Unlike the changes in International Shoe, the Honda Court found
no societal change justifying Oregon's abrogation of judicial review
for punitive damages, "nor do improvements in technology render
unchecked punitive damages any less onerous."226 In essence, the
need for review of excessive damage awards was as compelling in 1994
as it was in eighteenth century England. 227 Thus, unlike in Interna-
tional Shoe, Oregon lacked a justifiable societal impetus for its abroga-
tion of a common law procedure, and was unable to reverse the pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality on those grounds. 228
The Court also found that Oregon failed to replace the more
thorough abrogated review of punitive damages with other proce-
dures that afforded litigants similar protections. 22° As an example, the
Court pointed to Hurtado v. California, in which it found the state's
removal of a grand jury procedure for criminal defendants—a prac-
tice deeply rooted in the common law—was adequately replaced by an
appearance before a neutral magistrate."° By replacing the deeply-
rooted practice with an adequate alternative procedure, California
overcame what otherwise would have been a constitutional
infirmity."' In Honda, however, Oregon provided no similar substitute
procedure to make up for its removal of thorough punitive damage
review.252 The Court did not consider Oregon's review of punitive
damage verdicts that were without basis in fact to be a sufficient re-
inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction over non-resident corpora-
tions.") (internal quotations omitted).
223 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
22s
	
id.; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
2" See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430-31.
227 See id.
222 See id.; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
222 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
232 See id.; Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 516 (holding that examination by neutral magistrate
was adequate replacement for abrogated common-law grand jury procedure; Oregon in
contrast provided no similar substitute).
23 ' See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
232 See id.	 •
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view.233
 The lack of a replacement procedure meant Oregon was again
unable to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality, 234
IV. ANALYSIS: RULES PROHIBITING CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ARE VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, by analogy, evidences constitutional
infirmity in rules prohibiting' citation to unpublished judicial cleci-
sions.239 Like the appellate review of punitive damages in Honda, the
practice of citing all prior judicial decisions: (1) is deeply rooted in
common law tradition; (2) creates a presumption of unconstitutional-
ity if removed; (3) lacks an adequate replacement procedure; and (4)
was not abrogated in response to constitutionally justifiable societal
transfonnation.236 Therefore, like the procedure in Honda, abrogation
of the traditional connnon law ability to cite to all prior judicial deci-
sions violates procedural due process. 237
A review of legal history clearly indicates that litigants have long
been able to cite to previously-decided judicial decisions. 258 Early Eng-
lish lawyers often cited to prior decisions, long before the advent of
law reports, and even when the record of the decision existed only in
a haphazardly collected Year Book.239 As a more formalized reporting
system developed in England, lawyers began citing cases appearing in
law reports but also used decisions contained in their memories or
personal memoranda.* Even when the case was not included in a
report, the lawyer could attest to the validity of the case and then ar-
gue the reasoning and holding of the decision to the court. 241 At no
time in pre-American English law was a lawyer prohibited from citing
to a prior decision. 242
The English practice of citing all previous judicial decisions in
argument to the court made the Atlantic voyage with early colonists
and was followed in early American courts. 243 The advent of law re-
"3 See id.
234 See id.
235 See 512 U.S. at 415 (1994).
R58
 See id.
"7 See id.
233 See supra notes 30-111 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 30-38 and accompanyitig text.
21° See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
241 See XV HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 248.
245 See supra notes 30-55 and acconipanying text.
243 See supra notes 57-97 and accompanying text.
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ports brought new sources of previously decided cases. 244 These re-
ports, however, were not the only sources to which lawyers cited in
legal argument. 245 Lawyers continued to argue unpublished decisions,
frequently relying on their own notes or memorandum as their
sources. 246 Uninhibited citation to prior decisions continued as the
reporting system developed more comprehensively and was in place
at the inception of the current Federal Circuit Courts Of Appeal. 247
• Starting in 1891, when the initial Federal Circuit Courts Of Ap-
peal were created, all of the decisions of those courts were published
in the Federal Reporter: 248 Due to the comprehensive coverage of these
opinions in the Federal Reporter, there was never a need for lawyers to
cite unpublished decisions. 249 It was not until the circuit courts of ap-
peal responded to the ACAP recommendations and enacted limited
publication and no-citation rules that lawyers were prohibited from
citing prior decisions. 250
The history of lawyers citing to all prior judicial decisions is much
lengthier than the comprehensive punitive damage review considered
"deeply rooted" by the Honda Court. 251 Whereas the Honda Court
traced the practice of punitive damage review to the mid-seventeenth
century, the ability to cite prior decisions dates back four hundred
years further—to the middle of the thirteenth century. 252 The long
history of this citation procedure is sufficient to indicate a deeply-
rooted common law practice in accord with Honda.255 The removal of
the procedural ability to cite to previously decided cases, like the re-
moval in Honda, thus creates a presumption of unconstitutionali ty.254
The judiciary's desire in the 1960s to ease burgeoning caseloads
was an understandable goal given the pressure mounting on judges to
produce more opinions faster and the increasingly large body of
precedential judicial deciSions. 255 Concerns for judicial economy and
244 See supra notes 62-97 and accompanying text.
245 See RAM, supra note 84, at 28-29.
246 See id.
247 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
218 See BEARING, supra note 107, at 21; WOXI,A140, Supra note 107, at 123-24 (Spring
1985); YOUNG, supra note 107, at 302-03; FEDERAL REPORTER, supra note 107, at 3.
249 See id.
25° See supra notes 112-137 and accompanying text.
2" See Honda, 512 U.S. at 421-26; supra notes 30-111 and accompanying text discuss-
ing history of citation to previous judicial decisions.
t" See Honda, 512 U.S. at 421-26; WALKER & WALKER'S, supra note 33, at 82.
255 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 421-26.
254
	 id. at 430.
255 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, Stipa note 5, at 1167-70.
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precedent expansion, however, are not constitutionally sufficient rea-
sons to remove a deeply-rooted common law procedure. 256 In passing
their no-citation rules, the majority of the circuit courts of appeal nei-
ther provided adequate replacement procedures nor acted in re-
sponse to a societal transformation that necessitated the procedural
change.257 The majority of the circuit courts of appeal, therefore,
lacked either of the two justifications the Supreme Court set forth in
Honda for overcoming the presumption of unconstitutionality accom-
panying the removal of a deeply-rooted procedure.258
Some circuits were successful in enacting sufficient replacement
procedures to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. 259
The traditional common law citation practice that dates back to thir-
teenth century England allowed litigants to cite to all previous judicial
decisions. 26° It did not ensure, however, that those decisions would be
given binding or precedential effect. 261 Therefore, those circuits—the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh—that enacted rules
allowing the citation of previously decided judicial decisions for their
persuasive value, still afford litigants the citation ability they were af-
forded at common law.262 This level of replacement procedure, there-
fore, likely would be sufficient to overcome a presumption of uncoil-
stitutionality.268
Other circuit courts of appeal—the Federal, District of Columbia,
First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth—have failed to meet the first
constitutional justification by not creating an adequate replacement
procedure.264 In Hurtado v. California, the state replaced the tradi-
tional grand jury proceeding with an appearance before a neutral
magistrate. 265 Unlike Hurtado, these circuit courts have made no simi-
lar effort to create a replacement procedure that would afford liti-
gants' citation abilities similar to those of the traditional common law
266 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 421-26.
257 See id.
25B See id.
259 See FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); Firm CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH Cut. R. 28(g); EIGHTH CIR.
R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2.
266 See supra notes 30-111 and acco ►pan}iiig text.
261 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 345.
262
 See id.; FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH
CIR. R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH Cut. R. 36-2.
263 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
2" See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST Cut. R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; 'rump CIR. R. 1OP 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(c); NINTH CIR. R.
36-3 (b) (iii).
265
 See 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
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practice. 266 Most of these rules allow for citation to previous decisions
in instances of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. 267
This allowance, however, does not afford litigants the same rights as
those which existed in the traditional common law practice. 268 The
traditional practice allowed litigants to cite to any prior judicial deci-
sion that they thought pertinent to the disposition of their case. 269
The citation of prior decisions for the purpose of res judicata, collat-
eral estoppel, or law of the case, in contrast, is done only to avoid the
reconsideration of previously-decided legal or factual issues, not to
bolster the litigant's underlying case by way of analogy or compari-
son. 270 Moreover, the rule allowing citation to prior unpublished deci-
sions for res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case purposes
only affects a tiny, class of litigants—a fraction of the number covered
by the traditional procedure. 271
The limited scope of this citation rule replacement is comparable
to the inadequacy of judicial review for punitive damages at issue in
Honda.272 The Honda court found that a drastic decrease in the stan-
dard for judicial review of punitive damage awards meant that the
procedure was an insufficient replacement that could not reverse the
presumption of unconstitutionality.278 Similarly, Supreme Court re-
view of the citation prohibitions of the majority of circuit courts of
appeal likely would result in a conclusion that allowing citation to un-
published decisions for the purposes of res judicata, collateral estoppel
or law of the case is an inadequate replacement procedure. 274 There-
266 See id. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2) (F);
SECOND CR. R. 0.23; THIRD CIR. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e);
and NINTH CIR. R. 36-3 (b) (iii) (providing replacement procedure by allowing persuasive
citation of unpublished judicial decisions), with FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R.
47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH CIR. R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(s) (1) & (2); and
ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2 (prohibiting all citation of unpublished judicial decisions).
267 See D.C. Ctn. R. 28(c); Fen. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2)(F); SECOND CR. R.
0.23; THIRD CIR. R. IOP 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); NINTH CIR. R.
36-3 (b) (iii).
268 See supra notes 30-111 and accompanying text discussing the common law practice
of citing all prior judicial decisions.
2H See supra notes 30-111 and accompanying text.
270 See generally FRIEDENTHAL JACK ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE H14.1-14.12 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing law and policy of as judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case).
271 See id.
272 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
273 See id.
274 See Id.
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fore, these circuit courts would .be unable to overcome the presump-
tion of unconstitutionality on replacement procedure grounds. 275
Additionally, the circuit courts of appeal did not act in response
to a societal transformation necessitating change—the second consti-
tutional justification—when they enacted no-citation rules. 276 In Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court found that the common law
standard for the establishment of personal jurisdiction could be abro
gated because of the growth of corporations and their increased abil-
ity to engage in business in states without maintaining a physical pres-
ence.277 Additionally, technological advancement in travel and
communications made adjusting the jurisdictional requirements to
include distant litigation less onerous. 278 Justice required that corpo-
rations conducting business in a state be held accountable at law to
the litigants of the states in which they were acting.279 Adjustments to
the common law procedures for personal jurisdiction, therefore, were
necessary to bring the out-of-state corporations under the jurisdiction
of the state. 28°
No similar societal transformations required the circuit courts of
appeal to prohibit citation to unpublished decisions. 2" In passing no-
citation rules, the courts reacted to rising caseloads that created
heightened pressure on judges to produce more judicial opinions,
creating an excessively voluminous body of published case law.282
Thus, proponents of the no-citation rules likely would contend that
the transformation into an increasingly litigious society during the
early to mid-twentieth century compelled the circuits to alter their
citation rules to deal with unanticipated pressures on the judiciary. 283
This argument fails for three reasons. 284
First, the transformation into a more litigious, case-producing
society may be a justification for issuing unpublished opinions, but not
278 See id.
276 See id. at 430-31.
2" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,317-20 (1945).
278 See id.; Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604,617 (1990).
278 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617-19; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
284' See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617-19; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
"I See supra notes 112-130 and accompanying text discussing reasons for creating no-
citation rules.
282 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1167-70; supra notes 112-130 and ac-
companying text.
283 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1167-70; supra notes 112-130 and ac-
companying text.
284 See infra notes 285-325 and accompanying text.
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for prohibiting their citation. 285 By allowing judges to issue unpub-
lished opinions, the circuit courts of appeal have eased the work de-
mands of their member judges. 286 Those judges can issue terse opin-
ions that give only a basic recitation of facts and minimal
corresponding law. 287 They avoid the extensive research, reasoning
and writing that accompanies an opinion that is to be published in
the Federal Reporter. 288 According to one estimate, the creation of an
unpublished opinion takes only half the time required to produce a
decision of publishable quality.289
Citation rules prohibiting citation to unpublished decisions do
nothing to further ease the workload of federal appellate court
judges. 29° No-citation rules do not shorten the amount of time it takes
a judge to write, research or reason through a judicial opinion. 291
Moreover, the argument that citation prohibitions are necessary to
the success of a limited publication plan is false. 292 If a total citation
prohibition—including citation for persuasive value—were necessary
to the successful implementation of a limited publication system, the
rules of those six circuits that allow citation of unpublished decisions
for persuasive value would not remain viable. 293 The preservation of
limited publication schemes in those circuits indicates that citation
prohibitions are merely convenient, not necessary, to a functioning
limited publication system.294
If unpublished decisions are afforded the persuasive value to
which they are entitled under the traditional citation practice, judges
could easily distinguish or disregard them when they are cited to the
285 See supra notes 112-130 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
287 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1186; MARTIN, supra note 5, at 193-94.
288 See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1186; MARTIN, supra note 5, at 193-94.
289 See MARTIN, supra note 5, at 193-94.
288 See info notes 291-298 and accompanying text.
291 See .supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text discussing how it is the act of writ-
ing a less thorough unpublished opinion that saves judicial resources.
2" See FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH CIR.
R. 28(a) (1); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2.
285 See FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH CIR.
R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2.
284 Compare D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R. 36 (b) (2)(F); SECOND
CR. R. 0.23; THIRD CIR. R. IOP 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) & 53(e); and
NINTH Cm. R. 36-3 (b) (iii) (allowing persuasive citation of unpublished judicial deci-
sions), with FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH Cut. R. 28(g); EIGHTH Cm.
R. 28(a) (1); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2); and ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2 (prohibiting all
citation of unpublished judicial decisions).
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court. 295
 If the criteria the ACAP established for determining when to
publish a decision are followed when the publication decision is
made, the unpublished decisions litigants cite to are, indeed, of little
value and should require little judicial attention. 296 After all, under
the ACAP guidelines, the decision would not: (1) create or alter other
existing case law; (2) involve an issue of public interest; (3) criticize
existing law; or (4) resolve a conflict of authority. 297
 The additional
judicial resources required to deal with unpublished cases, given their
presumably negligible importance, is likely to be minimal.298
No-citation rules also do nothing to further limit the increasingly
large volume of published, precedential judicial decisions. 299 It is the
rule creating unpublished opinions, not the rule prohibiting their
citation, that reduces the volume of published case law by affording
judges the option not to publish decisions that contribute little or
nothing to the development of the common law. 500 Rules prohibiting
the citation of unpublished decisions are likely to have little effect on
judges' publication decisions."' In fact, empirical evidence indicates
that in those circuits that allow the citation of unpublished decisions
for persuasive value, the percentage of decisions designated for publi-
cation is lower than in those circuits that prohibit the citation of un-
published decisions. 502 Therefore, if citation prohibitions have any
correlation to the size of the body of published case law, it is a nega-
tive, not positive, one."'
The second reason the societal transformation argument fails is
that there are several other less onerous methods that could have re-
solved the problems created by an increasingly litigious society." 4 In
International Shoe, it was necessary for the Court to alter existing juris-
295 SeeAnvisoaY Comgcn., supra note 119, at 15-17.
296 See id,
297
 See id
"" See FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH CIR.
R. 28(a) (i); TENTH CIR. R. 36.3(B) (1) & (2) ; ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2.
299
 See supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
300
 See supra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
301 See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 11, at 114 (finding that lower publication rates ilk
those circuits which allow for the persuasive citation of unpublished decisions likely results
from the "rational belief that if unpublished opinions are citable, there is less harm in
leaving a decision unpublished.").
302 See id. (finding that those circuit courts of appeal that allow for persuasive citation
of unpublished judicial decisions saw a decrease in publication rates).
so See id. "
5°4 See Arnold, supra note 4, at 222 (noting that circuit courts of appeal have hired
more staff attorneys, heard less argument, and issued unpublished decisions to deal with
rising caseloads).
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diction rules because if it did not, people wishing to sue companies
that lacked a physical presence in their state would be denied a judi-
cial remedy for the harm they had suffered. 345 Put another way,
changing the common law jurisdictional requirements and allowing
litigants to obtain jurisdiction in more situations was the only way to
solve the problem presented by the societal transformation of inter-
state companies. 308
The problem of burgeoning caseloads, on the other hand, could
have been resolved in numerous other ways that did not require re-
moval of the deeply-rooted common law procedure allowing for the
citation of previous judicial decisions. 307 More judges could have been
hired for those circuits having difficulty dealing with the caseloads, a
new circuit could have been created to shift some cases away from the
most burdened circuits, or more staff attorneys, law clerks, and legal
assistants could have been hired to assist judges in the preparation of
their opinions.308 Additionally, the circuit courts of appeal could have
done as they did and decided not to publish certain opinions. 9 D9 Lim-
iting publication does not conflict with the deeply-rooted practice of
allowing litigants to cite to the decisions of all previous cases. 310 Given
the other less onerous options for addressing increasing caseloads, it
was not necessary for the circuit courts of appeal to abrogate a tradi-
tional common law procedure. 311
The third failure in the societal transformation argument is that
unlike in International Shoe, where transportation and communication
improvements strengthened the case for abrogating the traditional
common law procedure, in the case of no-citation rules, technological
and societal changes argue against making such a change.512 A large
reason for enacting the citation rules was a fear that the increasingly
large body of published case law was becoming difficult to research or
search through and impossible to master. 313 Technological advance-
305 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
300 See id.
307 See Arnold, supra note 4, at 222.
308 See id. See generally FINAL REPORT, COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS of APPEALS 54-60 (1998) (discussing possibility of adding an addi-
tional circuit court of appeals to ease burden of rising caseloads).
3°9 See Arnold, supra note 9, at 222; supra notes 112-122 and accompanying text dis-
cussing the initiation of limited publication rules.
310 See supra notes 30-111 and accompanying text.
311 See supra notes 307-310 and accompanying text; Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617-19; Inter-
national Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
312 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
313 See CHANIN, supra note 117, at 362; REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 5, at 1169-70.
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ments in computer technology and research capabilities, and the spe-
cialized nature of today's legal practice have, if anything, made these
concerns less compelling. 314
The use of sophisticated computer researching has enabled
judges and lawyers to locate helpful cases more easily than they could
have using traditional, manual research tools.315 The concern that
lawyers and judges would have to manually search endless digests and
law reports for applicable cases no longer exists. 316 Through the use
of computers, searches can be narrowed and refined to allow for an
exhaustive search of applicable case law. 3 t 7
Additionally, the practice of law has, in recent decades, trended
away from a general practice and into fields of specialties and sub-
specialties.318 As a result of this development, lawyers no longer need,
nor even attempt, to master the vast entirety of the common law. 319
Rather, most focus on their narrow specialty and monitor decisions on
related issues. 320 These technological and societal changes alleviate,
not accentuate, concerns over the ability to deal with an increasingly
large body of published case law. 32 I
No-citation rules were not a necessary resolution to the societal
changes that prompted their enactment. 322 Even assuming, arguendo,
that they were necessary, other less invasive changes could have eased
caseload pressure without removing a deeply-rooted common law
procedure.323 Further, technological advancement and legal speciali-
zation have, if anything, made the case for continuing the traditional
citation practice stronger. 324 The circuit courts of appeals are, there-
314 See infra notes 315-321 and accompanying text.
313 See Lynn Foster & Bruce Kennedy, Technological Advancement in Legal Research, 2 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 275,27983 (2000) (discussing ways in which the world wide web
and computers have made legal research easier).
316 See id.
317 See id.
318 See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV.
1003,1092-60 (1994) (documenting history of legal specialization and discussing Mere-
sing trend towards specialization in recent decades); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Changing Struc-
tures in the Practice of Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 167,167-69 (2000) (discussing increasingly spe-
cialized practice of law and how specialization causes lawyers to focus their continued
learning on discrete areas of the law).
319 SeeAriens, supra note 318, at 1009; Hazard, supra note 318, at 167-68.
32° See Hazard, supra note 318, at 167-68.
321 See supra notes 315-320 and accompanyitig text.
322 See supra notes 285-303 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 304-311 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 312-321 and accompanying text.
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fore, unable to justify their abrogation of the traditional common law
citation practices as necessary responses to societal transformation.325
To summarize, litigants have a deeply rooted common law right
to cite to all previous judicial decisions. 328 No-citation rules abrogate
that right, and thus, create a presumption of unconstitutionality. 327
The courts can overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality by
either: (a) enacting a sufficient replacement procedure; or (h) acting
in response to a societal transformation that necessitated the
change.528 Six of the circuit courts of appeal have enacted rules that
still afford litigants the right to cite to unpublished judicial decisions
for their persuasive value. 329 These rules provide comparable protec-
tions to those afforded litigants at common law, and, therefore, are
sufficient to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality.'" The
other seven circuits, however, neither enacted a sufficient replace-
ment procedure nor acted in response to a societal transformation
that necessitated the change. 331 Those seven circuits have, therefore,
abrogated the traditional common law citation procedure in a way
that is violative of procedural due process. 332
CONCLUSION
The no-citation rules of the Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Fed-
eral, District of Columbia, First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits are violative of procedural due process. The effects of a suc-
cessful procedural due process challenge to these rules are limited
but important. Striking these rules, unlike Anastasoff I, would not have
the sweeping effect of turning all of the unpublished judicial deci-
sions of the federal appellate judiciary into binding. precedent.
325 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431; Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617-19; International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 320
"" See supra notes 238-250 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
3" See Honda, 512 U.S. at 431.
3" See FOURTH CIR. R. 36(c); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5.4; SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); EIGHTH Cm.
R. 28(a) (i); TENTH Cut. R. 36.3(B) (1) (2); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2; supra notes 259-263
and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 259-263 and accompanying text.
331 See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; FIRST Cm. R. 36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. It
0.23; THIRD Cm. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); NINTH CIR. IL
36-3 (b) (iii); supra notes 264-321 and accompanying text.
332 See Honda, 512 U.S. at 430-31; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. Cm. R. 47.6; FIRST CIR. R.
36 (b) (2) (F); SECOND CR. R. 0.23; THIRD Cm. R. 10P 5.8 & 6.2; SEVENTH CIR. R.
53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); NINTH CIR. R. 36-3 (b) (iii); supra notes 264-321 and accompanying
text.
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Rather, litigants in every court would merely have the right to cite to
previous decisions—published or unpublished—for their persuasive
value. In addition to comporting with a common law tradition of
more than seven hundred years, such a result would also further one
of the fundamental issues raised in Anastasoff I: it would serve as a
check on the arbitrary power of the judiciary. If a judge decides a case
one way on Monday, he or she will know that from Tuesday forward,
litigants will use that decision to persuasively argue that similar results
are appropriate in their similar cases. Such a system is faithful to the
common law and assures that judges unpublished judicial decisions
are, minimally, afforded the same value in our legal system as the pub-
lished works of philosophers and playwrights.
LANCE A. WADE
